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PARAGUAY IN THE 1970s: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS* 
PREFACE 
Paraguay has long suffered from academic, as well as geographical, 
isolation. Few studies have been published of President Stroessner's 
political longevity, either by his admirers or by his critics. On 
the contrary, Stroessner's regime has been lumped together with 
Duvalier Jr.'s rule in Haiti (and formerly with Somoza's in Nicaragua) 
as examples of 'neo-caudillismo' or 'personalist dictatorships' that 
are dismissed as uninteresting relics of the 19th century. However, 
even a cursory glance at the background to the Stronista regime reveals 
important differences from his Central American and historical counter-
parts. Much of the misunderstanding that surrounds Stroessner's 
Paraguay stems from a dearth of information about the nature of the 
Paraguayan political process, which at the same time makes serious 
analysis speculative and tentative. 
Since the early 1970s, Paraguay's rapidly increasing insertion 
into the world economy and the possibility of bonanza benefits from 
Itaipu have started to have a profound impact on a previously more 
static socio-economic structure. This is not to deny that the ap-
parent quietude before the 1970s masked important variations in the 
social forces that have supported Stroessner since 1954, I but it was 
in the 1970s that a more complex social and political organisation 
started to emerge. The lack of historical distance from this period 
makes definitive statements hazardous, but at the very least it is 
possible to see rivalries within dominant social groups, which have 
proved to be of considerable political significance in the fall of 
other 'personalists1. 
The two main aims of this paper are 1) to give the essential 
historical background to the 1970s by focusing on Stroessner's 
emergence in 1954 and the consolidation of his position in the late 
1950s and 1960s, and 2) to examine the major political developments 
of the 1970s, with special emphasis on the political and socio-
economic impact of the economic boom which may or may not eventually 
bring changes in the dictatorship. 
One of the central themes is that Stroessner has shown the same 
capacity in the 1970s to adapt to the changing internal and inter-
national conditions as he showed in the period 1954-70. Despite 
the scale of the economic changes, despite the various internal and 
* The author wishes to thank A.W. Hill, J.C. Herken and R. Harris 
for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
external threats to his rule, and despite the social changes brought 
on by the introduction of capitalist forms of production, the 
Stroessner regime was no weaker at the start of the 1980s than at 
the start of the 1970s. Thus, there has not been as yet an 'in-
evitable' clash between a new stage of capitalist development and 
a personalised system of government. This view is corroborated by 
Stroessner's recent success in the Presidential elections of February 
1983 as the official candidate of the Colorado party. His seventh 
consecutive term of office is scheduled to last until 1988, by which 
time Stroessner will have been in power for a remarkable 34 years. 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1936-40: The Febreristas and their political impact 
The demobilisation of the army after Paraguay's victory in the Chaco 
War (1932-35) led to a group of army officers under the leadership 
of Colonel Rafael Franco, a popular hero of the war, seizing state 
power. The so-called 'Febreristas' (named after the date of the coup 
-17 February 1936) combined in a multi-party alliance against the 
Liberal Presidency of Eusebio Ayala. They shared similarities with 
'populist' movements in other Latin American countries at least in 
their political demands; a radical agrarian reform (which in one 
year was reported to have expropriated 200,000 hectares and dis-
tributed land to 10,000 families)^ a modest labour code (which 
included an 8-hour day for workers, the creation of a Departamento 
Nacional de Trabajo, and the formation of some 70 unions), and some 
modest industrialisation. However, they were clearly not a product 
of increasing urbanisation and industrialisation, but of a rapid 
demobilisation of 100,000 ex-combatants in Asuncion, a political 
phenomenon that has certain parallels in post-war Bolivia with the 
'military-socialist' regimes of Colonels Toro and Busch from 1936-39-
The weakness of the Febrerista attempt at radical reform was 
due both to the divisions within Franco's coalition and to the 
structural debility of the working class, the bourgeoisie and the 
campesinos, which was largely a result of Paraguay's limited 
ability to implement any industrialisation. Those companies who 
employed wage-labour for the processing of tannin, yerba and cotton 
were essentially foreign-owned 'enclave' industries, situated in 
the more remote rural areas of the country. The small size of the 
Paraguayan economy and its geographical remoteness meant obvious 
constraints on the growth of anything but minor industrialisation 
in the area around Asuncion, which prevented the rise of 'new social 
forces' that could have given political support to the Febreristas. 
Instead, the ex-combatants, who were mostly campesinos, were soon 
integrated back into rural life. Within two years of coming to 
power, many of the original members of Franco's government, includ-
ing fascists, socialists and even Colorados, had withdrawn their 
support, leaving Franco to rely solely on the Liga Nacional 
Independiente. By August 1937, the crisis for the traditional 
parties and the oligarchy whose interests they represented was 
resolved by the coup led by Colonel Ramon Paredes, in an alliance 
between those sectors of the military not touched by the Febreristas, 
and the new leaders of the Liberal Party, closely tied to the 
interests of the Paraguayan land-owning oligarchy and Anglo-
Argentine capital. 
The importance of the Febrerista period lies in (i) the need 
for the threatened oligarchy to reconsolidate itself by engaging 
in a political project of moderate reform (especially in the rural 
areas), designed both to reduce the likelihood of a return to power 
by the Febreristas, and to keep intact its own political and 
economic power, and (ii) the re-emergence of the conservative 
sectors of the military in an agreement with the 'new Liberals'. 
The military had always enjoyed a strong presence in Paraguayan 
politics, especially in the Liberal period from 1904 to 1921. 
However, after 1937, although the Liberals were nominally back 
in power under the Constitutional leader, Felix Paiva, the 
'oligarchic1 military officers were using the Liberal Party as a 
political front, and did not allow the pre-Febrerista Liberals to 
retain any influence. That the military were the real source of 
power is confirmed by the nomination of Marshal J. Felix Estigarribia 
for the Presidency in 1939, whose candidacy was forced on the 
Liberals. In February 1940, Estigarribia started a process of 
reducing even further the power of the Liberals by dissolving 
Congress and replacing the Constitution of 1870 with the new 
Constitution of 1940, based on the Estado Novo in Brazil, under the 
influence of a group of intellectuals named the tiempistas , who 
had clear fascist sympathies. 
The death of Estigarribia in an air crash in 1940 marked a 
further reduction in the Liberal Party's contribution to their 
alliance with the military. Estigarribia's successor, General 
Morinigo, fashioned a more open form of military rule in a fascist-
influenced government that sought to reduce the power of the 
traditional political parties both by decree and repression, and 
to rely almost exclusively on the support of the armed forces. 
He succeeded in undercutting some of the support of the Liberals 
in the countryside by closing down the Departamento de Tierras y 
Colonizacion which had been operating as a key point of contact 
between the campesinos and the party.5 In 1945, the defeat of the 
Axis forces was one of the factors behind Morinigo's eventual 
demise, as pressures for democratisation increased from 
'institutionalist' military officers, the new international 
climate and the reappearance of the more popular movement in the 
universities and unions. By 1946 Morinigo had been forced to 
accept a Colorado-Febrerista coalition government. The sudden rise 
in political activity unleashed by the new political freedom saw 
the Febreristas splitting with the Colorados and joining the 
Liberal party and the Communist party against the Morinigo-
supported Colorado party. The defeat of this alliance in the 
ensuing civil war of 1947 marked the political supremacy of the 
Colorado party over the Liberal faction of the oligarchy, a 
supremacy that has endured to the present, and is central to an 
understanding of the political longevity of Stroessner. 
The continuing political instability of the years following 
the civil war reflected the internal struggles of various factions 
within the Colorado party and the military. Initially the Colorado 
conflict centred fundamentally on the figure of Natalacio Gonzalez 
and his attempts to gain control of the Colorado party. Gonzalez's 
power base was the fearful Guion Rojo which had been formed in the 
mid-1940s in order to reduce the hold of the Febrerista and 
Communist parties on the labour unions by a programme of straight 
intimidation. In September 1949 Federico Chaves took over as 
head of the Colorados and also as the constitutional President. 
Chaves represented the democratico faction, labelled thus not 
because of any attempt to reduce the power of the oligarchy, but 
because of their opposition to the various Guionista factions. 
However, this democratico faction at first included a group of 
reformist Colorados, named Epifanistas after the then head of the 
Central Bank, Epifanio Mendez Fleitas, who showed definite anti-
oligarchic, anti-imperialist and pro-Peronist sympathies. After 
the removal of Natalacio Gonzalez in 1949, the struggle within the 
Colorado party increasingly focused on the Epifanista-democratico 
division, as by the time of the coup in 1954 most of the Guionista 
factions were in exile. 
The division can probably be approximated to two basic 
tendencies, the first more tied to traditional latifundista-ganadero 
support, and the second that can be classified as 'populist-reformist1 
because of its basic support for one sector of the campesinos, namely 
the minifundistas and other small landholders, whose economic 
position was rapidly deteriorating. The supposition that this was 
the most important divide within the Colorado party is supported by 
the increasing importance of the cattle-breeders in the economy 
since 1950. The more reformist sectors of the party had been 
promoting a policy of supporting the state meat-trading corporation, 
COPACAR, whose monopoly over the market was seriously undermining 
the economic power of the ganaderos and the two foreign-owned meat-
processing plants by the protection offered to smaller producers. 
From 1952 onwards, the Asociacion Rural del Paraguay, which had 
been founded in 1938 to defend the interests of the ganaderos and 
foreign companies against the threat of the Febreristas' reform, 
had been applying pressure on the government to increase the price 
of meat on the internal market. In June 1953 Chaves succumbed to 
the pressure from the breeders to lift the state subsidy on meat 
prices, a decision which heightened the rift between the reformist 
and democratic sectors and led to the sacking of Epifanio Mendez 
and three of his most important supporters. 
Stroessner's consolidation 
The central elements of the political situation which 
Stroessner inherited were not only (i) the predominance of the 
Colorado party after their victory in the Civil War of 1947 over 
its traditional rivals, and (ii) an increasing conflict within the 
Colorado party between the oligarchic and anti-oligarchic elements, 
but also (iii) the continued political instability inimical to the 
United States and certain sectors of the oligarchy. There can be 
little doubt that the political stability that Stroessner 
represented emerged as a solution acceptable to the U.S., as 
continued internal chaos could have led to the dominance of the 
faction within the Colorado party that had definite sympathies 
with Peron. In the early 1940s the U.S. government had given aid 
to the Morinigo government to offset Argentine influence. In the 
early 1950s the U.S. is known to have been equally concerned with 
possible spread of pro-Peronist governments to Argentina's neigh-
bours. A few months after Stroessner's coup, governmental and 
private aid from the U.S. began to increase. In June 1954, after 
securing the nomination of the Colorado party for the upcoming 
elections, Stroessner travelled to Lima to meet with members of the 
North American Strategic Command in the Caribbean, and then in 
August of the same year held a second meeting in Paraguay. 
However, it was by no means certain that Stroessner would be 
able to consolidate himself against the traditional parties, dis-
affected Colorados and the more popular movement that centred on the 
student movement and the Paraguayan Communist party. At the time of 
the coup, the democraticos and the Epifanistas within the Colorado 
party both imagined that they could use Stroessner against the other 
group. However, in a complex series of adroit machinations, 
Stroessner was able to use the various factions within the party and 
the army to isolate key rivals, most importantly Epifanio Mendez 
Fleitas, who had supported Stroessner in the coup against Chaves but 
was still trying to forge a powerful coalition of labour unions, 
populist army officers and nationalist intellectuals as a personal 
power base.9 
The real defeat for both an incipient trade union movement and 
the more popular sectors of the Colorado party came in the crushing 
of the General Strike in August 1958, that stemmed from the drastic 
effect of the IMF stabilisation plan of 1956-57- When members of 
Congress expressed concern over the levels of brutality used by the 
police and armed elements of the Colorado party in squashing the 
rising level of violence, Stroessner dissolved Congress, sent the 
army into Asuncion, and exiled 400 members of the more reformist 
elements of the Colorado party (where they formed MOPOCO under the 
leadership of Epifanio Mendez Fleitas). 
The years after the suppression of the General Strike and the 
exile of MOPOCO are central to an understanding of the fusion of 
Colorado and military support that Stroessner continues to represent. 
Pressure applied by sectors of the military to reject Colorado support 
had been resisted by Stroessner in 1955, 1958 and 1959? as it must 
have been very apparent that a personalist with a ready-packaged 
propaganda and electoral machine had a greater chance of survival 
than one that depended on force alone. At the same time, because 
of Stroessner's position as head of the military, he was able to 
suppress the Colorado party at the very moment he lost control of it 
in 1958-59. The use of Stroessner's twin institutional supports, the 
Colorado party as a publicity agent and the military as an instrument 
of oppression, remains one of the crucial factors behind the 
longevity of the Stronista regime.''0 By 1966, with the fall of 
Stroessner's main personalist rival Ynsfran, large sections of the 
Colorado party had been turned into a system of clientelism that was 
more of an identification with Stroessner than with the party. The 
whole structure had been reorganised along lines of verticilidad 
that ensured an efficient, cohesive and obedient organisation, 
sufficiently free from the old factionalism.^ 
The 1960s also witnessed the beginning of a general process in 
which the latifundista class and those sectors of the military and 
Colorado party personally loyal to Stroessner ('neo-Colorados') 
began to show a joint interest in the bringing of capitalism to the 
rural areas. The military for the first time increasingly became 
an economic force by buying up newly available land, especially in 
the Eastern Border Regions (EBR), where large expanses of the old 
latifundia were sold off to a newly emerging agrarian bourgeoisie, 
made up especially of top Generals. 
The government's colonisation scheme throughout the 1960s 
in the EBR was an essential part of this process. Since the early 
1950s, state measures had been taken to reduce the pressure on the 
over-populated areas of the Central Region by transferring squatters 
and poor farmers to the EBR as part of an extensive colonisation 
programme. The agrarian census of 1956 showed that 83$ of the 
population owned b.2% of the land, while b.3% of the population owned 
as much as 92.7$, a pattern of land distribution that was particularly 
acute in the Central Region with the co-existence of extensive cattle-
rearing alongside small squatters and minifundistas. Historically, 
the pressure on the land in this region had been eased by the mass 
emigration of Paraguayans to the metropolises of Buenos Aires and 
Sao Paulo (as well as other paths of migration).'12 One estimate is 
that by 197^ as many as 680,000 migrants (or 28% of the present 
Paraguayan population) had left Paraguay.^ 
In 1963, with the encouragement of the Alliance for Progress, 
the Instituto de Bienestar Rural (IBR) was established by law no. 852 
to increase the number of peasants being affected by the colonisa-
tion programme. According to official figures, 38,000 lots of an 
average of 20 hectares were distributed in the period 1956-68. For 
the longer period 1956-77, it is thought that as many as 100,000 
new properties with an area of k million hectares were created in 
the EBR. Even if some account is taken of the fact that the 
figures are official, perhaps as much as one fifth of the rural ^^ 
population have been affected by the colonisation scheme since 1956. 
In the execution of the colonisation programme, the state 
agency, IBR, was in an exceptionally favourable position, because 
of (i) the availability of land in the EBR which had belonged to 
the state since the 1880s, and (ii) the fact that the government 
encountered no political resistance from the old yerba and tannin 
latifundia in the EBR. In the period 196O-76 as many as 
latifundia with an area of million hectares were affected in . 
Concepcion, Caaguazu, Alto Parana, San Pedro, Itapua and Amambay. 
lack of resistance from the major latifundia in the EBR was 
almost entirely due to the decline in the yerba and wood production 
which had lost its profitability since the 1940s. Until the mid-
19603 the three major companies that owned a large portion of the 
EBR were 1) La Industrial Paraguaya, an Anglo-Argentine company 
dealing mainly in yerba and logging, 2) the Barthe family, dealing 
in yerba, and 3) La Matte Larangeira (a Brazilian-based yerba 
company) who sold most of their land to the Lunardelli family in 
the 1950s. In the period 1967-77 La Industrial Paragua.ya sold off 
1 million hectares, the heirs of the Barthe estate more than 
250,000 hectares and the Lunardelli family ^00,000 hectares, 
mostly to Brazilian land companies. At the same time, the IBR 
sold other areas of the EBR to leading officials in the military 
and the Colorado party at prices well below the market value, 
parts of which have been sold off in the 1970s to Brazilian land 
companies based in Sao Paulo, at prices highly inflated because 
of the increase in agribusiness and other projects linked to the 
construction of Itaipu in the EBR.17 
The colonisation programme had the political effect of 
satisfying the land problem for a significant number of mini-
fundistas , and therefore of easing the population pressures in 
the Central Region that could have resulted in significant political 
mobilisation. The reproduction of the minifundista conditions in the 
EBR through the extension of the agricultural frontier allowed the 
Colorado party to refurnish its image of the campesinista% which 
helped to increase its sources of support at times of elections. The 
fact that in reality most of the peasants affected by the colonisation 
programme did not substantially improve their economic position, 
basically through lack of credit or back-up facilities, was not so 
important politically. Equally significantly, the disintegration 
of the latifundia in the EBR, the extension of the agricultural 
frontier, the availability of the minifundistas as a cheap source of 
labour as a result of the colonisation scheme and the general improve-
ment in the accessibility of the area through the improved infra-
structure, were four of the main conditions for the introduction of 
the various forms of capital in the EBR. Indeed, this is one of the 
central features of the 1960s, that the Stronista regime throughout 
the decade had created the political and economic conditions for the 
high growth trajectory of the 1970s, which depended to a great extent 
on the bringing of capitalism to large areas of the Paraguayan 
countryside. 
The formation of the IBR was part of the boom in state projects 
that stemmed from the increase in the amount of aid that flowed from 
the United States, as a result of the 'process of democratisation' 
initiated in 1963 in response to the demands of the Alliance for 
Progress (although levels of economic assistance had always been 
high; from 1954-60, the figure was 25 million dollars, 1961-63, 
37 million, and for 196^ alone, 26 million). This external source 
of aid not only allowed the co-option of large numbers of peasants 
into the political project of the Colorado party, but also created 
an over-inflated state sector, which increased enormously the state's 
role as an employer. From 1967 to 1971 foreign loans to the public 
sector totalled 128.7 million dollars, while to the private sector 
the figure was only 9-9 million. The physical and economic integra-
tion of the country was matched by the creation of new public 
institutions and companies politically tied to the Colorado party, 
which by 1972 employed as many as 12$ of the economically active 
population of Asuncion (40,000 employees)The creation of such 
'state companies' had the important political effect of maintaining 
the loyalty of senior military, Colorado and police officials, as 
many of them controlled what were in effect state monopolies in most 
major commercial areas, which provided a front for extremely lucra-
tive contraband operations. The division of the smuggling operations 
and whole sectors of the economy between military officers is well 
documented, and points to the key factor behind the military's 
loyalty to Stroessner.20 This contraband was and is, as Stroessner 
himself has candidly remarked, 'the price of peace'. 
At the same time, many members of the small Paraguayan middle 
classes joined the Colorado party to get access to jobs, as all 
public employees including the judiciary, officers in the army and 
most professional classes had to be fully paid-up members of the 
Colorado party. For such a small and underdeveloped country as 
Paraguay, once such control of the state was engineered, the 
opportunities for patronage became the most important source of 
political support, as the party could function as a mutual aid society 
and channel for social mobility, and eclipse the Liberal party by 
having the edge in patronage opportunities. 
The problem of presenting a democratic facade to ensure the flow 
of funds from the United States was solved by the decision of one 
sector of the Liberal party under the Ruffinelli brothers to take part 
in the elections of 1963 (there were rumours that they had been paid 
by Stroessner). In 1968 the decision of the Partido Liberal Radical 
(that broke from the Ruffinelli-controlled Partido Liberal in 1963 
over the latter's complicity) and the Febreristas to take part in the 
Presidential elections of that year eased Stroessner's problem of 
continuismo. Both parties had been granted legal recognition for 
the municipal elections of 1966, on the condition that they accepted 
constitutional reforms that allowed Stroessner to be re-elected and 
guaranteed legal opposition to one third of the seats in Parliament, 
whatever their vote in the elections. 
The 1960s also witnessed a progressive weakening of the left 
after the crushing of the Paraguayan Communist Party in 1958, which 
until the defeat of the General Strike had worked to create some 
base in the CTP (Confederaci6n de trabajadores paraguayos).After 
1958, the leaders of the CTP were replaced by top Colorado officials 
loyal to Stroessner, and from that moment the CTP (which now repre-
sents 90% of the work force) has remained incorporated by the 
Colorado party. Stroessner is annually declared their 'number one 
worker'. The umbrella organisation FULNA (made up of sections of 
the Communist, Liberal, Colorado and Febrerista parties) had 
surfaced in 1959-61 as a result of the success of the Cuban revolu-
tion, and the closing of the 'democratic path' in 1959. The organi-
sation was wiped out by efficient army operations, supported by armed 
Colorado peasant militia. In similar fashion, Communist party 
guerrillas which had continued to operate in the eastern region of 
Paraguay from 1960-65 were finally destroyed by a combination of 
infiltration, the separation of the military and political arms, 
large amounts of U.S. counter-insurgency aid and the naked power of 
the army. 23 
In summary, the most important factors for an understanding of 
the background to the 1970s are 1) Stroessner's reliance on the 
support of the Colorado party and the military. The participation 
of the latter in low and high level contraband operations, in 
addition to a huge defence budget and very generous tax allowances, 
ensured their political fidelity. Any modernising or 'breakthrough' 
elements within the military had been defeated in 1937 with the 
overthrow of the Febreristas, and subsequently repressed. High 
Colorado and military officials also began to have a combined economic 
and political stake in the bringing of capitalism to the rural areas. 
2) The pervasiveness of the Colorado party, which could count on 
multi-class support - sectors of the peasantry, the trade unions, 
the middle classes, the industrialists and the old latifundistas -
and its manipulation into more of a personalist party machine, with 
its many factions united and arbitrated by Stroessner. 3) The crucial 
support of sectors of the legal opposition to ensure electoral 
continuismo. k) The high level of U.S. aid because of the successful 
achievement of a democratic fa$ade. 5) The creation of the right 
economic and political conditions for the economic boom of the 1970s. 
PARAGUAY IN THE 1970s 
General Stroessner won the February 1983 Presidential 'elections' 
with a reported 90.8% of the vote. Even if there had been no fraud, 
no political repression and no restrictions on opposition parties, 
most commentators are agreed that Stroessner would have emerged 
triumphant. His reselection for his seventh consecutive term of 
office, which will mean 3^ years of continuous rule if completed in 
1988, would suggest that little has changed to undermine Stroessner's 
position. 
Stroessner's political base still consists of the twin 
institutional supports of the military and the Colorado party. 
Despite constant rumours of 'deep divisions' especially within the 
Colorado party, as more 'nationalist1 or *populist' sectors of the 
party voice their discontent with more 'opportunist' sectors of the 
party, there are few signs that this discontent is more widespread. 
Stroessner's position as a unifier of the various factions is the 
essential factor behind the continued political cohesion of the party. 
Without him, the Colorado party would undoubtedly suffer more serious 
divisions. 
However, the sheer scale of the economic changes in the 1970s 
has led to important new developments in the political process, and 
may lead to significant changes in the long term. The accelerated 
economic growth, the 'Brazilianisation' of the Paraguayan economy and 
the construction of the Itaipu dam have created new political 'issues' 
and areas of conflict. These economic developments have combined 
with changes within the Paraguayan church, in the position of the 
United States and in the strategy and make-up of the illegal and 
legal opposition to make the Paraguayan political process at the 
very least more complex. 
The economic boom 
The 1970s marked the beginning of what many authors see as the 
most important stage in the economic history and long-term political 
development of Paraguay. Throughout the 1960s large inflows of aid 
under the Alliance for Progress had failed to achieve the required 
increase in productivity in the agrarian sector, and had not 
stimulated much industrialisation as the share of the industrial 
sector in GDP remained constant at 13%. However, in the 1970s a 
combination of a massive increase in foreign capital inflows 
especially in the agribusiness sectors, and the signing of the two 
huge hydro-electric projects with Brazil and Argentina enabled 
Paraguay to achieve figures for its economic growth that are 
comparable with Brazil's own 'economic miracle' of the years 1968-74. 
For the latter part of the 1970s Paraguay recorded the highest 
growth of any Latin American country (except for Nicaragua, which 
was recovering from the ravages of the popular war against Somoza). 
As can be seen from the bottom half of Table 1, the two main 
sectors that were responsible for such growth were (i) increased 
exports of certain agricultural crops in world demand and (ii) civil 
engineering, which enjoyed the boom in construction surrounding the 
building of Itaipu. 
Table 1 
1963-72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Rate of growth 
of GDP {%) 4.8 7.8 8.3 5.0 7-3 11.8 10.3 10.7 11.4 8.3 
Rate of growth 
of GDP p.c. at 




- 3-9 4.9 9.4 6.4 9-2 10.6 9.0 
- 21.2 17.6 31.7 32.0 -
Sources: Paraguay Economico and Inter-American Development Bank. 
Agricultural production took off in the 1970s largely as a result 
of the increase in capital inflows from abroad. Although in the 1960s 
the Paraguayan government had attempted to attract foreign investment 
by offering the incentives of liberal repatriation of profits, a 
stable government and currency, and a cheap labour force, with some 
notable e x c e p t i o n s 2 6 the volume of foreign capital penetration 
generally remained low (because of geographical isolation, poor 
communications and a tiny market). However, (i) the ready availability 
of international credit on a large scale in the 1970s, (ii) the rise 
in investment opportunities in the Eastern region of Paraguay because 
of the improved infrastructure, and (iii) the two large hydro-electric 
projects, together accounted for huge amounts of capital inflows from 
both world and private banks, and foreign companies attracted by 
Paraguay's extremely liberal tax l a w s . 2 7 
The largest share of the private investments was undertaken by 
multinational agribusiness concerns in agricultural production and 
processing. G0% of this was directed towards the four departments of 
Paraguay's Eastern region (Itapua, Alto Parana, Amambay and Canendiyu), 
the main area for the dynamic growth in cash crops.2" Most of the 
investment went into the production of grains and oil seeds, and the 
processing of wood, cotton and soya beans for export. Changing world 
demand and prices for cotton, soya and meat products, certain actions 
taken by the Stroessner government and the opening of the agricul-
tural frontier in the EBR through improved infrastructure enabled 
Paraguay to boost its agricultural production and exports. Soya 
production increased from 40,000 tons in 1970 to an estimated 900,000 
tons in 1981, while cotton production increased from 17,000 tons to 
330,000 tons in the same period. The increase in agricultural exports 
compensated for the decline in Paraguay's traditional meat production 
for export, which came about as a result of EEC import restrictions in 
the early 1970s. Whereas livestock products dropped from 27% of 
exports in 1970 to 2% in 1981, agricultural products increased their 
share from 52% in 1970 to 81% in 1981. 
The growth of the civil engineering sector stemmed largely from 
the "building of Itaipti. Although the greater part of the demands 
resulting from the hydro-electric project has been met by Brazilian 
firms, international consortia and multinational corporations, 
Paraguayan firms have been able to supply about a quarter of the 
goods and services, especially in the provision of raw materials 
for the construction work. At the same time, the growth in urban 
property development both in the areas around the construction site 
and in Asuncion has further stimulated this sector, to give an 
average growth rate of 20% p.a. from 1973 to 1978. 
The 'Brazilianisation1 of Paraguay 
The accelerated economic growth of the 1970s was closely tied 
to the ' Brazilianisation' of Paraguay, which involved the expansion 
of economic, diplomatic and commercial links as well as the large-
scale immigration of Brazilian colonists into the EBR. The signing 
of the treaty of Itaipu between President Stroessner and President 
Medici on 26 April 1973 was a symbol of the increase in Brazilian 
influence over Paraguay and the eclipse of Brazil's old rival, 
Argentina. From a Paraguayan perspective, the main rationale for 
the replacement of Argentina by Brazil as the dominant regional 
power was Paraguay's need to reduce her dependence on Argentina for 
her trade routes and markets. Brazil, on the other hand, needed to 
find export markets for her goods and cheap sources of energy to 
finance her industrialisation programme in the Sao Paulo region, 
especially after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1974. This 
expansion of Brazilian influence has been seen by some authors as 
part of a grand strategy to bring Brazil's weaker neighbours under 
her more 'formal1 control, while others see it as cementing 
Paraguay's position as a faithful satellite of 'sub-imperialist' 
Brazil, which is in turn dominated by monopoly capital and trans-
nationals based in Sao Paulo. 
In 1966 the two countries had been brought closer together 
physically by the construction of the Puente de la Amistad and by 
the new highway linking Asuncion and Sao Paulo. Diplomatic rela-
tions were also improved by the offering of Brazilian credit for 
the building of the trans-Chaco route, a bridge over the river 
Paraguay at Puente Remanso, and a road linking Asuncion to the 
bridge. The treaty of Itaipu healed an important diplomatic rift 
between the two countries, as it meant that Paraguay finally dropped 
its lingering claims to sovereignty over the Guaira falls on the 
river Parana. Prior to the Act of Iguazu of 1966, Paraguay had 
claimed that the whole of the falls was within its- national 
territory. Although the Paraguay government announced its satis-
faction with the Act in 1966, doubts had remained about Brazil's 
real intentions and Paraguay's willingness to accept those 
intentions. 
The increasing Brazilian role in Paraguay's economy can be 
seen by the boom in legal and illegal trade between the two 
countries. In the period 1976-80, Paraguay became the second most 
important market for Brazilian goods. By the end of the decade 
Brazil had outstripped Argentina both as a source of Paraguayan 
imports and as a recipient of Paraguayan exports. In the years 
1973-79, 31% of all Paraguayan imports came from Brazil and only 
20% from Argentina, while for the years 1975-77, 29% of all Para-
guayan exports went to Brazilian markets and only to Argentine 
markets. 
The reduction in Anglo-Argentine participation in the Paraguayan 
economy was largely due to the collapse of the processed meat 
industry after the EEC protectionist policies in the early 1970s. 
Thousands of hectares of land, especially in the EBR, were sold off 
in the 1970s to multinational firms, Brazilian capital and 'neo-
Colorados1. In the period 1974-80, British and Argentine capital 
invested in Paraguay amounted to only 4% of the total investment. 
Some idea of the increase in contraband trade between Brazil and 
Paraguay can be gained from the table below. In the years 1973-75, 
Brazilian registered imports from Paraguay were over five times 
greater than Paraguayan registered exports to Brazil. Paraguayan 
registered imports from Brazil were three-and-a-half times less than 
Brazilian registered exports to Paraguay. 
Table 2 
All figures in millions of dollars. 
Source: Adapted from R.A. Nickson, 'El comercio ilegal entre Para-
guay y Brasil', Revista 'Criterio', no. 1, Segunda Epoca 
(Asuncion, 1977). 
Of course, contraband between the two countries only represents a 
small percentage of the total volume of contraband traffic, but what 
is significant is the rapid increase post-1972. By 1975, illegal 
exported goods to Brazil reached 13-5% of all Paraguayan exports, 
and illegal imported goods from Brazil represented 43.8% of the 
total value of Paraguay's imports.32 
There are no signs that the trend has diminished, as one 
estimate claims that for the Paraguayan soya crop alone for the year 
1980, 400,000 tonnes out of a total crop of 900,000 were smuggled 
over the border to the processors in Brazil.33 The ubiquity of 
contraband operations in the area is partly explained by the weak 
integration of the region with the rest of the Paraguayan economy, 
so that few controls are enforced. Such is the complexity of 
some operations that Brazilian soya and coffee is 'imported' 
illegally into Paraguay, and then re-exported from Paraguay to other 
markets, as the differences in taxes and exchange rates improve the 





























Other indicators of increasing Brazilian involvement are (i) an 
estimated 60% of total financial operations is now controlled by 
Brazilian b a n k s ( i i ) a number of joint programmes have been signed 
bet ween the Paraguayan state and Brazilian capital (especially to 
build a steel factory and a plant for the production of gasohol); and 
(iii) the heavy involvement of Brazilian companies and medium-scale 
farms in the production of agricultural crops (especially soya) and 
cattle-raising. 
The participation of Brazilian farmers in the soya boom is 
closely tied to the Brazilian colonisation of the EBR. The migration 
of up to 350,000 Brazilian colonists (consisting mostly of small land-
owners of less than 50 hectares) stems not so much from a deliberate 
policy of either government as from a complex interaction of a number 
of factors.Such is the magnitude of the 'invasion' that Brazilians 
now make up 60% of the population of the three departments of Amambay, 
Canendiyu and Alto Parana, and more than 10% of the total population 
of Paraguay. In the Eastern region, Portuguese is the main language 
spoken, and the cruzeiro the dominant currency. In addition to the 
number of small farmers emigrating, there is an increasing number of 
Brazilian companies, especially involved in the saw mill industry 
which has boomed since the export of unsawn timber was banned in 1972 
by the Paraguayan government. One author has estimated that 58% of 
the land in the state of Alto Parana now belongs to Brazilian 
companies, and that in Alto Parana, Canendiyu and Amambay 80% of the 
most fertile land does not belong to Paraguayans. 
The degree to which the Brazilian penetration of the EBR has had 
a political impact is hard to assess. Despite the magnitude of the 
'invasion', there are few signs that it has become an enormous 
political issue, not least because of the lack of information and the 
physical remoteness from Asuncion. 
In geo-political terms the rising influence of Brazil over 
Paraguay may turn out to be the most lasting legacy of the 1970s. 
Such is the extent of Brazilian influence that one author can claim 
that 'the Paraguayan regime receives from Brazil all the support 
necessary for its stability and continuation in power. •38 Without 
wanting to assert that Stroessner is so dependent on Brazilian 
support, it is clear that the Brazilian vested interest in a govern-
ment sympathetic to her needs, and the eclipse of her traditional 
rival, will be one more factor in the increasing complexity of the 
Paraguayan political process. It is a well-known historical fact 
that Argentina and Brazil have been engaged in a long struggle to 
maintain maximum influence over Paraguay. This conflict is reflected 
in certain members of Stroessner's government having predilections 
or sympathies for one or the other. There are already suggestions 
that key officials in Stroessner's ruling elite are receiving bribes 
to ensure a continued pro-Brazilian stance over the low cost of 
energy to Brazil.39 
ITAIPU 
The building of the Itaipu dam on the Brazilian border and the 
projected dams at Corpus and Yacyreta-Apipe on the Argentine border 
has developed into the single most important focus of political 
attention. It is difficult to grasp the full extent of the economic, 
political and social impact of the two hydro-electric projects on 
Paraguayan development, both in the period since the beginning of 
construction of Itaipu in 1974, and in the future. Apart from being 
one of the two main factors behind Paraguay's economic growth, the 
significance of Itaipu lies in (i) the scale of the project in terms 
of a) its capacity, b) its possible revenue, and c) its financial 
requirements; and (ii) its position as a source of potential political 
opposition to Stroessner's regime. The problem for the regime has 
been, and still is, to absorb the criticism that Paraguayan national 
interests have been betrayed by certain terms of the treaty. 
Secondly, it has been transformed into a central arena of political 
discussion between important sectors of the dominant class as to 
the optimum use of its undoubted benefits. The emergence of a 
widely-publicised debate over the future use of either the revenue or 
the electricity from Itaipu reflects two different strategies for 
Paraguay's future economic development, which have some correspondence 
with different factions of the dominant classes. 
Itaipu is the largest dam in the world. Construction of the dam 
itself was completed slightly ahead of schedule on November 5, 1982. 
The first 700,000-kilowatt power unit is planned to go on stream in 
1983, to be the first of three being activated annually until all 18 
turbines are installed by 1989- When completed, Itaipu will produce 
an estimated 12.6 thousand MW (megawatts) of electricity p.a., 
equivalent to 22% of the total capacity of the British Central 
Electricity Generating Board. It is six times larger than the Aswan 
dam in Egypt, and twice the height of Centre Point in London. 
Paraguay's entitlement to 30% of the electricity generated is equiva-
lent to 48 times its present requirements, or, expressed differently, 
about one fifth of one of Itaipu's eighteen generators. It is clear 
that as Paraguay cannot possibly absorb anything like its share of 
the electricity, the country has the potential to become an 'energy 
emirate' and a key epicentre for supplying cheap energy to Brazil's 
industrialisation drive in the Sao Paulo region. 
The projected cost, to be paid jointly by Brazil and Paraguay, 
has escalated from an estimated 3,400 million dollars in 1973 to 
7,600 million in 1976 to 8,800 million in 1978. Recent estimates of 
200,000 million dollars' worth of financial investment needed before 
completion in 1989 represent six times Paraguay's GNP for 1979, and 
twenty times the value of Paraguay's registered trade for the same 
year, an investment per capita of 6,000 d o l l a r s . 
Initially in 1973, criticism of the terms of the treaty centred 
on one or all of the following: (i) the price at which Paraguay was 
going to sell its share of the electricity to Brazil: it was noted 
that the price was fixed at 1973 prices for the next 50 years, and 
took no account of the market rise in energy costs; (ii) the 
conditions of transfer of the electricity: in particular, Paraguay was 
not allowed to sell its share to other countries; (iii) the financial 
terras of the treaty: in particular, the 50 million dollar loan, 
granted by the Brazilian government to enable the Paraguayan state 
electricity company (ANDE) to pay its half-share of the capital stock 
of Itaipu Binacional, would in effect rise to 90 million dollars by 
1983, the year the first turbine was then designed to come on stream; 
(iv) the allocation of contracts offered to Paraguayan companies: the 
percentage of contracts for the construction of the dam only amounted 
to 15-25% of the total; (v) the obstacles put in the way of renegotia-
tion, not least by the administrative structure of Itaipu Binacional 
that concentrated executive power in the hands of the Brazilians; and 
(vi) the lack of certainty as to which nation would have military and 
policy control over the area under the jurisdiction of Itaipu 
Binacional. 
It would have been surprising if the treaty had made no political 
impact on a country with a strong sense of nationalism and sovereignty. 
The genesis of a tangible political issue of apparent betrayal of 
Paraguayan national interests was in contradiction to Stroessner's 
identification with nationalistic heroes of the past, and offered a 
real threat to Stroessner, not least from more nationalist sectors 
of the military and the Colorado party. Fuel was added to the fire 
by the government's emphasis on the desarrollista aspects of the.treaty 
and not the negocio itself. A storm of protest ensued which included 
a series of vitriolic speeches in the House of Representatives, a 
degree of student mobilisation in the universities (especially in the 
engineering faculty), and a strident campaign in the press, apparently 
encouraged by leading members of the army.^ Although the treaty was 
passed in both Houses (which is unremarkable, given the mandatory two-
thirds majority of the Colorado party), the mounting nationalist 
campaign must have been perceived as a threat serious enough to justify 
the Colorado party mobilising an estimated 50,000 loyal supporters 
on 14 August 1973 in favour of the treaty. The Colorado party's 
propaganda machine was sufficiently well-oiled to demonstrate enough 
'popular support' to go some way towards neutralising the challenge 
from outside the Colorado party and from certain high-ranking military 
officers within it. 
However, more significantly, it soon became apparent that behind 
the scenes Stroessner was embarking on a slow process of making 
important concessions to leading members of the elite as a means of 
absorbing some of the mounting criticism. A series of complex 
annexes was added to the original treaty of 1973; the first of these 
in January 1974 was an amendment to article 18, which in effect 
limited the area under the control of the Brazilian security forces 
to the Brazilian side of the border (under the original terms of the 
treaty, the Brazilians had control over both sides of the border, a 
point which reportedly angered the Paraguayan military). Later, 
more important changes were made concerning the currency in which 
Brazil would pay Paraguay for her share of the electricity (namely, 
in dollars and not cruzeiros) and concerning the frequency of the 
Paraguayan national electricity grid. Such concessions from Brazil 
increased Paraguay's participation in the joint venture and lessened 
the effect of some of the terms of the treaty most injurious to 
Paraguayan interests. More importantly, they had the political 
effect of reducing some of the pressure on Stroessner at the time 
of the initial signing of the treaty. 
However, the issue of the price of Itaipu's electricity 
((i) supra) still remains unresolved at the time of writing (March 
1983), and therefore a focus of political debate. Official govern-
ment estimates of the amount of revenue accruing to Paraguay if all 
its share of excess electricity is sold, stand at 30.3 million dollars 
annually (10.8 in compensation, 6.0 dividend, 11.7 royalties and 1.8 
million administration). However, an examination of Table 3 reveals 
that the benefits can vary from 10.8 million dollars to 1,273 million 
dollars annually, according to the method of calculation. 
Table 3 
Possible Benefits to Paraguay from the Export of Electricity from Itaipu 
Method of calculating 
benefits or 'compensation' 
Cost of unit in 
thousands of 
dollars per Kwh 
Annual benefit in 
million dollars p.a. 
1. According to original 
wording of Treaty of 
Itaipu (without re-
adjustment) 0.3 10.8 
2. According to Treaty 
with adjustment 1.5 34.0 
3- According to world 
prices for electricity 
(compared with unit 
cost for nuclear energy) 40.0 1,273.0 
Souree: R. Canese, Ideas preliminares sobre el qu6 hacer con la energia 
de Itaipfl (Asunci6n 1980)„ 
The official figure of 30.3 million dollars is reduced to 10.8 
(Figure 1 in the table) according to the original treaty, if it is 
assumed that payments will be made to Paraguay by Itaipu Binacional 
(the juridical binational company set up in 1974 with overall 
responsibility for the project, of which Paraguay is an equal 
partner), and not by Brazil. Figure 2 is achieved, if compensation 
payments are adjusted in proportion to the six-fold rise in the 
original cost-estimate of 2,000 million dollars. Figure 3 is 
achieved if Brazil were to pay Paraguay a price equivalent to the 
unit cost of her nuclear programme.^ There is a strong current of 
opinion among sectors of the dominant classes in favour of re-
negotiating the price of the electricity, using the methods of 
calculation behind Figures 2 and 3- The possibility of a 
'nationalist backlash' is still a threat to the regime. 
The eventual price to be paid by Brazil is not the only problem 
facing the Stroessner government. By 1981 Brazil's energy consump-
tion had plummeted from an average 12% p.a. growth throughout the 
1970s to 3%« Itaipu's major market area, Brazil's industrialised 
South East, has a reported surplus of 1.3 million kilowatts of 
electricity in early 1983. Delays in the completion of Itaipu's 
18 turbines do not run against Brazil's interests. Reductions in 
the Brazilian government's expenditure on Itaipu have already post-
poned for one year the construction of a 2 billion dollar, 700 
kilometre transmission line between the dam and the industrial parks 
around Sao Paulo. 
From a Brazilian perspective, there is little need for a rapid 
installation of the turbines without transmission lines and with the 
serious decline in the demand for electricity. There are already 
reports that Brazil has cancelled all new investments in hydro-
electric power for the 1980s, and is also negotiating to sell its 
surplus energy (from sources other than Itaipu) to Argentina. 
There are three major problems for the Stroessner government. 
Firstly, the decline in investment and construction work resulting 
from Itaipu is one of the main factors behind the recent 2.5% drop in 
GNP for 1982. Secondly, the work-force at Itaipfu has been reduced 
from an estimated 30,000 to 10,000. Paraguayans are thought to have 
made up half the original work-force. Failure to offer alternative 
sources of employment to a more politically-conscious work force could 
have a significant political effect. Previous government plans had 
presumed that the run-down in the work on Itaiptu would be compensated 
by the commencement of work on the dams at Corpus and Yacyretd, built 
jointly with Argentina on the river Paran&. However, economic and 
political problems facing Argentina and continued haggling between 
the Franco-Italian company Dumez e Impreglio and the binational company 
Yacyretd over the distribution of civil engineering contracts are still 
preventing work being started on the dams, nine years after the project 
was first discussed. 
The threat from the left 
Since the destruction of the FUI2VA and Communist Party guerrilla 
units in the middle of the 1960s, the Paraguayan left had made little 
political headway. However, a slow process of radicalisation of 
sectors of the church throughout the decade of the 60s, the growth 
of the Ligas Agrarias in the Central Region, and the emergence of 
a radicalised student movement in the Catholic universities combined 
to offer the most serious threat to Stroessner in the mid-1970s from 
the 'illegal opposition'. 
Until the early 1960s the Paraguayan church remained largely 
confined within the old 'patronato real' system, established in the 
period of Spanish colonial rule, which in the spiritual sphere meant 
emphasis on the 'world beyond' rather than on the poverty and misery 
of the peasantry, and in the political sphere meant a close relation-
ship with the Stronista government. However, throughout the 1960s, 
and even before the Bishops' Conference at Medellin in 1968, certain 
sectors of the Paraguayan Church were beginning to assume a more 
active pastoral role. Firstly, the increase in the number of bishops 
and priests and their contact with the poor, secondly, the influx 
of young Jesuit priests and particularly their employment in the 
newly-formed Catholic universities, and, thirdly, the wider dis-
semination of the social encyclicals of Pope John XXIII and, later, 
Pope Paul VI, meant that at least one strand of the Paraguayan 
Church began to question both the nature of the political regime 
and the Church's role in the rural areas. 1° 
In December 1968, the 44th Assembly of the Paraguayan Bishops' 
Conference made a public stand against the number and treatment of 
political prisoners, and condemned the corruption of the regime. 
One year later, for the first time the bishops widened their area 
of concern by condemning the government's proposal for a new anti-
subversive law, by demanding structural changes in the whole social 
and economic order (including a radical agrarian reform). Most signi-
ficantly they endorsed a more active political role for the church in 
society. This deterioration in church-government relationships was 
epitomised by the excommunication of Interior Minister Dr. Sabino 
Montanaro and Chief of Police Francisco Britez in 1969? as a result 
of their complicity in repression dealt out against students, priests 
and nuns who were peacefully demonstrating against the deportation 
of a Paraguayan priest, Father Oliva. 
In the early 1970s, the church did not lessen its political 
activism in the rural areas, which provoked a concerted campaign on 
the part of the government to taint the church with the Communist 
brush, and hence discredit the radicalised priests in the eyes of the 
peasantry with whom they were working. A barrage of crude govern-
ment propaganda was matched on a more practical level by the harass-
ment of church officials, including priests from other countries. 
When, in May 1972, Father Cavarias, a Spanish Jesuit priest working 
in the zone of Piribebuiy, became the eighth priest to be expelled by 
the government since 1969, it became even more apparent that the main 
reason for the increasing concern of the government was the church's 
involvement in the Ligas Agrarias movement.° 
The origins of the Ligas were heterogeneous; they were 
concentrated in the Central region where 80% of the Paraguayan 
population are situated and where the conflict over the distribution 
and ownership of land has always seen at its most acute. From 1962 
onwards they grew in membership under the auspices of different 
organisations in different areas of the Central Region, mostly 
promoted by the church; although the Paraguayan Communist Party is 
thought to have had some contact with the Ligas, most of them were 
linked to the church through organisations like the Tercera Qrden 
Franciscaia,the Juventud Obrera Catolica and the Confederacion 
Cristiana de Trabajadores. As most of the Liguistas were small 
producers and not an agricultural proletariat (although the 
distinction is always difficult), most of their demands focused on 
more land and better prices for their products, while there was no 
recorded agricultural workers' strike for a wage increase. Most 
of the communities combined self-help on a practical level through 
the formation of distribution and small producer co-operatives 
(called opcndivepa) with theoretical reflection based on biblical 
readings designed to improve their understanding of the reasons for 
their poverty and exploitation as a result of their marginalised 
position in Paraguayan society. 
In the early stages the objectives of the Ligas were confined 
to the promotion of their own education, the organisation of means 
to by-pass intermediaries and the spreading of Christian ideas of 
fraternity. However, by the 1970s a process of radicalisation had 
occurred such that the necessity to transform political structures 
through organised action came to be discussed with much more 
urgency among some of the Ligas. This radicalisation had come about 
as a result both of a long period of gradual increase in awareness, 
and also of the repression that was already being dealt out against 
them. After the long 'gestation' period of the 1960s, there were 
signs that more overt and quite explicit political objectives were 
now dominant. 50 
The desire for political change at a national level faced many 
obstacles; firstly, in general the Ligas were organised on a highly 
localised system with little contact at a national or regional level. 
Secondly, those organisations that did have the potential to be more 
widely based (like FENALAC and FCC which had links with the Christian 
Democrat Party) tended to be urban-based and lacked the full 
confidence of the peasants. Many of the Ligas wanted to keep their 
autonomy both for financial reasons and to avoid the often paternal-
istic and 'caudillo' attitudes of which the peasant organisations 
and some of the priests were guilty. Thirdly, the dependence of 
the Ligas on their church sponsors and the increasing internal rifts 
within the church hierarchy made some of the Ligas look for 
alternative forms of political and religious organisation.51 The 
attitude of some members of the church hierarchy had always been 
deeply suspicious of the direction that the Ligas were taking and 
after 1973 this worry that the Ligas were being taken over by the 
Marxist left changed to actual withdrawal of some support. 
From the government's point of view, it is not difficult to see 
why even in the early stages the Ligas were subject first to harrass-
ment and then to crude repression. On an economic level, the Ligas 
offered the small producers a means of by-passing the intermediaries 
and acopiadores, who are often the local representatives of the 
Colorado party. On a political level, the existence of autonomous 
peasant organisations offered a very real threat to the Colorado 
party's traditional source of support, which depended on an 
unquestioning and politically apathetic peasantry. The church's 
partial support for such organisations compounded the threat, as the 
Paraguayan church has international links, a nation-wide media net-
work and a traditional religious hold over the peasantry, which 
meant at least the potential for large-scale opposition to the 
government. 
After 1973 the mutual distrust between the church and the Ligas 
led some of the more radicalised Liguistas to break away from the 
paternalism of the church and to look for a wider political alliance. 
This radicalisation coincided with the emergence of the urban-based 
O.P.M. (Organizacion de Primer de Marzo) which drew its support 
mostly from the middle class Catholic universities-, and especially 
the Movimiento Independiente (formed in 1965 as a loose amalgam of 
non-Colorado students).The O.P.M. maintained its independence from 
the traditional political parties (including the Paraguayan Communist 
Party), had links with the Argentine E.R.P., and advocated a prolonged 
people's war on the basis of a worker-peasant alliance (with the 
hegemony of the former). Links were engendered between the leaders of 
the urban O.P.M. and the Ligas, which provided the urban-rural link 
necessary for a serious challenge to the regime. 
The government's response to the increasing radicalisation of the 
Ligas was both to increase the repression and to capitalise on the 
growing rift within the church hierarchy by stepping up the campaign 
of calumny against the more radical priests. After the brutal 
destruction of the community of Jejui in February 1 9 7 5 t h e death 
of the Ligas came with the discovery by the authorities of the O.P.M. 
organisation and its links with the Ligas. Within days the government 
was able to round up the nucleus of the organisation in such a way 
that 30 leading Liguistas were assassinated in different parts of the 
country and at least 500 others were arrested. Such was the 
effectiveness of the repression that the Ligas and the O.P.M. were 
almost completely destroyed,53 and neither organisation has maintained 
any political impact. At the same time, the government was able to 
make the accusation stick that 'Communist priests' were part of an 
organisation committed to the violent overthrow of the state. Tenuous 
links between priests and the O.P.M. had the desired effect of dis-
crediting the church's involvement in politics and annulling the more 
militant priests' influence within the Catholic hierarchy. 
Since 1976 the Paraguayan church has confined itself more to 
treating the symptoms than the causes of the oppression of the 
Paraguayan peasantry. There have been strident criticisms of the 
government's human rights abuses and its treatment of Indians, but 
in general the fate of the Ligas left the Paraguayan church facing 
the essential dilemma of the church in many other Latin American 
countries. As one author expresses it, 
'(The Paraguayan church) ... finds itself spontaneously 
pitted against a fanatically anti-Communist government 
because of the perpetuation of social injustice and 
poverty engendered by that government's system of 
privilege and power. Yet at the same time, the 
Catholic Church in Paraguay is terrified by the 
spectre of Communism.' 
No single exhaustive account has yet been published of the 
failure of the Ligas or of the O.P.M.55 It would seem that over the 
period 1975-76 (and in the case of the O.P.M., again in 1978), the 
most brutal and systematic repression since the period 1959-61 was 
the main factor behind their defeat. But, at least for the Ligas, 
their reduced influence was not just due to repression. The Ligas 
members were largely small producers, and in 1973 prices both for 
basic food crops and cash crops rose substantially (rice by 52%, soya 
by 54%, tobacco by 26%, wheat by 130% and cotton by 123%), which 
must have had a significant softening impact on some of their 
grievances. 
This view is supported by the knowledge that by the end of the 
1970s no less than 60% of cotton, 72% of tobacco and 30% of soya bean 
output was produced by small-scale agricultural commodity producers. 57 
Such an improvement in prices (destined to be only ephemeral) was at 
least one factor behind the decline of the Ligas. 
Secondly, there is some dispute over the extent of their 
influence and the number of Liguista members. While some estimates 
put the membership as high as 20,000, others claim that only 3,000 
joined the Ligas.59 One author makes the central point that the 
movement hardly touched the majority of the 'class', which would 
be corroborated by the fact that an estimated 60-70% of the total 
Paraguayan population of 3 million live in the rural areas."0 If 
it is right to speculate about the real extent of influence of the 
Ligas, this would endorse the O.P.M.'s self-criticism that the 
'subjective conditions' (levels of organisation and consciousness 
amongst the peasants) were not right for the armed struggle. 
Also, O.P.M.'s strategy of attempting to replace the Ligas with its 
own organisation and its failure to transform the student-peasant 
alliance into a worker-peasant alliance both militated against the 
possibility of its success. 
Even if the absence of more detailed information makes it 
impossible to give precise reasons for the failure of the O.P.M. 
and the Ligas, it is clear that these organisations offered the 
greatest threat to the Stroessner regime in the 1970s from the more 
popular sectors, which the government showed itself capable of 
neutralising. 
The United States and the legal opposition 
The campaign over the Itaipu treaty also marked an important 
stage in the political development of Liberalismo. If the various 
Liberal parties were ever to provide a united front, they would be 
the only party other than the Colorados with a mass base capable of 
having a significant electoral impact. The beginning of the process 
in 1963 in which the Liberal party moved away from expressing the 
interests of certain sectors of the oligarchy was carried to a 
further stage by factions of the party starting to represent the 
interests of the 'national bourgeoisie' and the urban middle classes. 
This consisted of political demands to defend national sovereignty, 
an 'independent economy' and the widening of certain basic rights 
for peasants and workers.Although the Liberal party, like the 
Febreristas, has always contained within it a multitude of political 
positions and personalist factions, the formation of the Partido 
Liberal Radical Autentico (PLRA) in September 1977 seemed to mark 
the purification of the party into a closer representation of a 
'class position'. In February 1977, the Partido Liberal Unido had 
boycotted the vote within the Constitutional Assembly to prevent an 
amendment in the Constitution to permit President Stroessner's re-
selection. However, Stroessner split the party by granting legal 
recognition to those sectors of it that were willing to participate 
in the elections, and support his 'continuismo'. The PLRA was that 
sector of the party which refused to co-operate with those 
'opportunist' sectors who were happy with their mandatory one third 
of the seats in Congress. This inability to agree to a united 
strategy was compounded by the gradual reduction of the party's 
contact with the campesinos, because the local caudillos, 
acopiadores and alcaldes had largely been taken over by the Colorado 
party. 
This 'purification' of the Liberal party was finally confirmed 
by the signing of the Acuerdo Nacional in February 1979, which 
advocated a more uncompromising opposition to the regime, and 
consisted of the PLRA, the Febreristas, and the Christian Democrats, 
and later one wing of the exiled Colorado party, M0P0C0, led by 
Waldino R. Lovera (the other wing, led by Mendez Fleitas, refused 
to join). The Acuerdo Nacional's programme was not economic, but 
concentrated on the demands for the restoration of human rights, 
the lifting of the state of siege, the return of the thousands of 
exiles, freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary and 
the installation of a democratic system of government; it was 
explicit in its rejection of the violent path to change. Its main 
weaknesses were immediately apparent: (i) its lack of grass-root 
popular support; (ii) its amalgam of different political parties of 
heterogeneous origins and political 'legality'; (iii) the constant 
harrassment, repression and imprisonment of its leaders; and (iv) its 
lack of full support from the more radical sectors, who welcomed its 
anti-dictatorial stance, but questioned its backing from important 
sectors of the bourgeoisie who had already benefitted under 
Stroessner. However, its main strength was a certain amount of 
qualified support from the United States under the Carter administra-
tion. 
Relationships between the United States and Stroessner had 
always been close, largely because of Stroessner's uncompromising 
anti-Communist stance and the openness of the Paraguayan economy to 
foreign capital. Until 1972 the large amount of contraband within 
the Paraguayan economy had not been a problem for the U.S. govern-
ment because a high percentage of the trade was in 'soft goods' like 
whisky and cigarettes. Unlike the situation in Bolivia, the heavy 
involvement of leading members of the Stronista clan in the contra-
band 'industry' could more easily be overlooked. However, in 1972 
the Nixon administration put pressure on Stroessner to extradite 
Auguste-Joseph Ricord, the Corsican king-pin of the Latin American 
heroin trade with the United States, who was using Asuncion as his 
major staging-post. The problem for Stroessner was that key members 
of his government were Ricord's chief contacts in Asuncion and that 
therefore there was a strong possibility that they would be impli-
cated if Ricord were ever r e l e a s e d . W h e n a Paraguayan court 
announced that extradition was refused on the grounds that Ricord 
had committed no crime in the United States, Nixon threatened to 
cut off aid. The problem was only surmounted by the timely death 
of one of Stroessner's generals, Patricio Colman, as a result of a 
lingering bullet wound given to him by the popular guerrilla leader, 
Arturo Lopez Areco. 65 
With Carter's Human Rights policy came the possibility of a 
serious threat to Stroessner's stability. Historical precedents 
abound for 'dictators', especially in Central America, being under-
mined by the partial withdrawal of crucial support from the United 
States. One of the key factors behind the success of the Cuban 
revolution was the United States's equivocal relationship with 
Batista; Trujillo was assassinated by the C.I.A. in 1961 when it 
became increasingly obvious that he was an embarrassment and 
unwittingly preparing the way for Castroism; the success of the 
Sandinistas was at the very least facilitated by the Carter 
administration's indecision and vacillation over support for Somoza. 
In 1976, Paraguay must have appeared as a 'safe bet' for the 
Carter administration to show its concern with 'democracy' and human 
rights, and follow the prescription ot the Trilateral Commission to 
pre-empt popular insurrection and a world economic crisis by moderate 
reforms. After the elimination of the Ligas and the O.P.M. the 
threat from the left was extremely weak, whereas the opportunities 
for promoting the legal opposition were strong. Thus Robert White, 
the then Ambassador to Paraguay, in a series of moves promoted the 
Acuerdo Nacional, criticised the human rights record and even 
threatened to cut off some aid if no improvement were made.66 To 
Stroessner, whose attitude towards the United States was encapsulated 
in his comment that 'the United States Ambassador was an extra member 
of his cabinet', the withdrawal of unconditional support must have 
come as a serious threat to his rule. On one level, the response was 
to condemn the 'interventionist' character of the United States and 
to organise demonstrations outside the U.S. embassy, with the under-
lying theme that 'Paraguay would remain anti-Communist with or 
without the support of the United States'. But on another level, 
Stroessner was adroit enough to make some concessions, especially 
in the area of human rights. The first National Human Rights Congress 
was allowed to be held in Asuncion in December 1978, and the number 
of political prisoners, some of whom had been in prison for twenty 
years, dropped from over 400 to about 20 in the years 1977-78. Such 
concessions were clearly regarded by the United States as an accept-
able improvement, as at no point in the years 1976-80 did the United 
States stop supplying Paraguay with economic aid, although military 
aid was reportedly reduced to zero for the years 1979-81.^7 
The fact that Stroessner was not seriously weakened by the 
combined pressure of the Acuerdo Nacional and the United States bears 
witness to his political adroitness and security. With the election 
of the new United States President in 1980, the significance of the 
'U.S. factor' obviously lay in the area of continuity rather than 
change. At the same time, the Acuerdo Nacional lost much of its 
political force, not only because of the departure of Robert 'White 
as Ambassador but also because of problems internal to itself. The 
PLRA still suffers from harassment, and has yet to cull the benefits 
of its strongly abstentionist line on elections, when other factions 
of the Liberal party still agree to compete. It has been further 
weakened by the expulsion of its best-known leader, Domingo Laino. 
In December 1982 Laino was thrown out of the country after the 
publication of his book El General Comerciante about the life of 
Stroessner's erstwhile ally, General Anastasio Somoza. Although it 
contained nothing new on Somoza, the Paraguayan authorities condemned 
the book as an apology for a criminal act (namely, the assassination 
of Somoza). Unofficially, the thinly-disguised parallel between the 
lives of Somoza and Stroessner was probably the real reason for 
Laino's expulsion. 
The decline of the Christian Democrats has coincided with the 
decline of the Paraguayan church as a political force. The party 
also lost its leader, Professor Luis Resck, who was expelled from 
the country in 1981. Various attempts by Resck and by leaders of 
M0P0C0 to return in 1981-83 have all met with failure and have usually 
ended with the aeroplane on which they were travelling being turned 
back. The Febreristas still suffer from serious internal divisions. 
The election of President Euclides Acevedo in the November 1981 Party 
conventions was interpreted as a move to the right, and has further 
alienated the more radical youth wings. 
In general, the Acuerdo Nacional's emphasis on the human rights 
issue has failed to have the political impact that it has had in 
Paraguay's neighbouring countries. Stroessner's concessions in the 
mid-1970s were one of the main factors why the Acuerdo Nacional cannot 
gain more political capital out of the issue. The Acuerdo Nacional's 
recent failure to make more out of its abstention in the recent 
elections, its inability to appeal to the radical left, and the fact 
that human rights are not such an explosive issue, together suggest 
that the Acuerdo Nacional is unlikely to have much effect in the 
short-term evolution of Paraguayan politics. 
The rise of a 'national bourgeoisie'? 
The years of the Carter administration coincided with the rise 
of certain nationalist business sectors, who, since the signing of 
the treaty of Itaipu, had slowly been associated with the increasing 
opposition to the terms of the treaty. By 1977, after much debate 
in the press, the nationalist lobby had gained enough strength to 
force President Stroessner to declare that Paraguay would not change 
the frequency of the national electricity grid from 50 cycles per 
second (Hz.) to the Brazilian system of 60 cycles per second (Hz.), 
a decision which would clearly favour greater domestic utilisation. 
The political significance of this declaration was that the Brazilian 
government, the Brazilian press and Sr. Enzo Debernardi (the head of 
ANDE, joint director of Itaipu Binacional and senior technocrat in 
Stroessner's government) were all advocating the installation of 
expensive electricity converters to allow for maximum sale of 
Paraguay's share of the electricity to Brazil. Within a general 
perspective, the fact that it was Stroessner's personal decision 
marks the first step in a gradual process of some concessions being 
made to sectors of the bourgeoisie whose incipient political 
influence Stroessner could not afford to alienate. 
The 'national bourgeoisie' is traditionally regarded as 
expressing its class interests through the U.I.P. (Union Industrial 
Paraguaya), which broke away from FEPRINCO (Federacion de Produccion, 
Industria y Comercio) in 1973, reportedly over the issue of 
protectionism versus free trade.69 Until the arrival of Itaipu, 
FEPRINCO was obviously content to rely on the Stronista state for 
the maintenance of capitalist conditions, although there were 
constant demands for some protection for local industries against 
the 'unfair competition' of the high levels of contraband. Because 
state power was controlled by major contrabandistas, and because of 
the constraints on industrialisation (especially the close proximity 
of Brazilian and Argentine industries), Paraguayan industrialists 
had little choice but to be content with meagre political 
representation. 
However, in the 1970s the prospect of using the windfall profits 
from Itaipu and of benefitting from joint operations with multi-
national capital formed the background to certain sectors of the 
'national bourgeoisie' seeking more adequate representation at the 
level of state power. The possible significance of a 'national 
bourgeoisie' withdrawing support from a 'military-personalist' regime 
cannot be ignored, when the distancing of such a bourgeoisie from 
Somoza, Franco, Salazar and the Greek Colonels is regarded by many 
authors as the major factor behind their eventual downfall. The 
Nicaraguan industrial and commercial groups, GOSEP and INDE, became 
more vociferous in their protests over competicion desleal with 
Somoza after 1972; their political manifestation in UDEL, and latterly 
FAO, were symptomatic of major divisions within the Nicaraguan 
capitalist class, which led the way to the crucial withdrawal of 
their support for Somoza.70 Likewise, although Spain, Portugal and 
Greece were obviously at different stages of development, 
'what is beyond doubt in all three cases is that 
gradually, if in different degrees, broad sectors of 
the domestic bourgeoisie distanced themselves from 
military dictatorships and withdrew their support, 
whereas broad sectors of the comprador bourgeoisie 
supported it to the end'.71 
In the particular case of Paraguay, it is necessary to examine 
whether a 'national bourgeoisie' can plausibly be said to exist and, 
if it does, whether the conflict over the benefits of Itaipu can be 
approximated to a primary contradiction (like that in Nicaragua) or 
a secondary contradiction, reflecting two alternative visions of 
bourgeois development open to the Paraguayan upper class. 
On the one hand, U.I.P. (and FEPRINCO) do make economic and 
political demands that could support the identification of a 
'national bourgeoisie' (namely, the end to export taxes and import 
taxes on industrial inputs, the elimination of internal taxes, and 
a degree of protectionism from the extremely liberal laws towards 
foreign capital investment). On the other hand, U.I.P. is clearly 
made up of disparate factions with different economic needs and 
political demands. The last Guia Industrial (1977) showed that out 
of 7,008 companies, 6,110 employed less than five workers. Of 20,000 
manufacturing units in Paraguay, only 600 are large-scale industrial 
plants, generating 48% of the value of the sector and employing only 
15% of the work force. Not surprisingly, artisans comprised 15,000 
of the units and 44% of waged and self-employed labour and generated 
20% of the value. 72 The duality of the industrial sector is 
reflected in the U.I.P., where 50 to 60% of the membership is small-
scale businessmen. The internal size divisions are compounded by 
sectoral differentiation; textiles, furniture and shoes are seriously 
threatened by competition with contraband, while other sectors like 
plastics and chemicals are not so endangered. Also, there are 
divisions over their attitude to joint operations with foreign 
capital; milk producers, for example, do not welcome the further 
intrusion of companies like Nestle.73 These internal variations make 
the political manifestation of a unified 'national bourgeoisie' with 
a single demand unlikely. 
The second problem is that, in the absence of a study of family 
group interests in different sectors of the economy, it is hard to 
make definitive statements about the 'ontological reality' of a 
distinct landed oligarchy and industrial bourgeoisie. The overlapping 
of 'neo-Colorados', the old latifundista class and industrialists, all 
with interests in the business sector, suggests that the national 
bourgeoisie is not sufficiently homogeneous to be called a separate 
class. It has been claimed with some justification that since the 
beginning of the 1970s there has been a slow process of fusion between 
the three 'sectors', to such an extent that it is hard to distinguish 
their individual interests. 7k The dangers of setting up a 
•recalcitrant latifundio class' or a corrupt 'retrograde sector closely 
identified with Stroessner' against a modernising business sector are 
corroborated by: (i) the fact that an estimated 70% of Paraguay's 
manufacturing sector is directly related to agribusiness activities;^ 
(ii) the fact that certain members of the Stronista clan have important 
business interests; 76 and (iii) the fact that, members of the modernis-
ing sector historically have been close allies of Stroessner. 77 
Yet, at the same time, it is clear that a nationalist business 
sector has begun to make its political presence felt throughout the 
1970s, not only in the issue of the conversion of the Paraguay 
electricity grid, but also in a campaign conducted in the press over 
the high pricing of the electricity from Paraguay's present 
electricity generator 'Acaray', the controversy over the formation of 
the state oil company PETROPAR (which clearly benefitted high govern-
ment officials and excluded any private sector contribution), and 
over the contracting of an independent study on the possible use of 
the electricity from Itaipu. 
It is in this last area that the business sector and other 
factions of the bourgeoisie have exhibited a certain degree of 
political distance from the government's position. The debate over 
the future development strategy has been played out in the national 
press, especially ABC and La Tribuna, who are simplistically thought 
to reflect the views of the commercial/finaneial bourgeoisie and the 
industrial bourgeoisie respectively. Broadly, ABC advocates a 
'deepening' of the agro-export model, and opposes any rapid expan-
sion of the industrial sector, especially the use of electricity-
intensive industries. This is because of (i) the constructural 
constraints of the lack of mineral resources, the geographical 
isolation and the small size of the local market for the products 
of such industries; and (ii) the perceived need to avoid the social 
cost of a rapid process of proletarianisation. Instead, Paraguay's 
share of the electricity should be exported to Brazil, but with the 
proviso of an upward revision of the price, which would boost foreign 
exchange earnings and give the basis for a series of state infra-
structure projects to boost agriculture and agro-industries. 
The other model, as presented by La Tribuna, has been 
characterised as 'state capitalism' in that it advocates a rapid 
programme of maximum domestic utilisation of Paraguay's electricity 
share, and therefore of energy-intensive industrialisation like 
aluminium-smelting and fertiliser or cellulose plants. Local 
industrialists would be able to participate in joint ventures with 
multinationals, attracted to Paraguay by the cheap energy source.79 
However, it is now clear that if the dispute is expressed in 
the extreme terms of 'industrialise or export the electricity to 
Brazil', it neither offers a credible portrayal of the options open 
to the Paraguayan government, nor does it reflect the definitive 
economic projects of certain political classes. Although the 
government is yet to announce its plans for the use of the 
electricity (which has seriously undermined U.I.P.'s attempts at 
attracting foreign capital by their inability to quote definite 
electricity prices), most commentators are agreed that the govern-
ment's eventual position will be closer to that advocated by ABC, 
in terms of its promotion of the agro-export model, while at the 
same time making important concessions to national business sectors 
by favouring the foundation of some electro-intensive industries and 
the promotion of agribusiness in which local capital can participate. 1 
But for a political analysis of the 1970s, the dispute over the 
benefits of Itaipu is regarded as significant because of the splits 
within the dominant class and apparent signs of their showing a 
certain distance from Stroessner. However, because of the historical 
proximity and lack of accurate information, definitive statements 
about who the new groups represent, the degree to which they offer a 
serious threat to Stroessner and the level of the conflict between 
them, are difficult to make. For example, the newspaper ABC, and its 
editor Aldos Zucolillo, have been likened to La Prensa and Pedro 
Chamorro in Nicaragua, in their principled opposition to certain 
aspects of Stroessner's regime. Thus, since the beginning of the 
1970s, there has been a maintained campaign against the future price 
of the electricity, the high level of state corruption, the presence 
of Somoza in Asuncion, the Brazilian penetration of the Eastern 
region and even the ineptitude of certain ministers. 
The advocacy of the development strategy is meant to correspond 
to the interests of the financial, commercial and service capital 
sectors which have boomed since 1973 (because of the rapid increase 
in the amount of foreign currency inflows, building societies, banks, 
finance companies and foreign exchange companies have grown to such 
an extent that by 1980 the 'service' sector accounted for of GNP.) 
However, the identification of a paper's position with a certain 
faction of the bourgeoisie in opposition to Stroessner must be 
questioned when (i) the Zucolillo group, the owners of ABC, have 
wide capital interests, not only in the financial and import-export 
sectors, but also in civil construction and consumer goods; (ii) the 
same Zucolillo family have long been 'critical supporters' of the 
regime, in that certain aspects of the Stronista rule (like the 
monetary and political stability) are welcomed as the right conditions 
for capital accumulation, although ABC is more in favour of a freer 
market economy; and (iii) whereas ABC's rivals, La Tribuna and 
Ultima Hora, have been the victims of closures, ABC has been allowed 
to remain open, which suggests a degree of political protection from 
high government officials. However, although it is not helpful to 
equate the newspaper with a faction of the bourgeoisie, it is probably 
the case that ABC has now become the most important non-governmental 
source of political opinion and influence. 
Similarly, the close identification of the paper La Tribuna with 
the political project of the 'national industrial bourgeoisie' is not 
helpful, when it is remembered that this 'national bourgeoisie' argues 
for the use of Paraguay's electricity share as a way of attracting 
large international and regional capital to the country, in order to 
get more access to regional and international markets and industrial 
technology. Whereas in the 1930s it may have been easier to talk of 
a 'national bourgeoisie' able to benefit from an Import-Substitution 
approach, the conceptual difficulties of such terms in the new inter-
national context of complex arrangements between state capital, local 
national capital and international capital make the positing of 
easily-identifiable 'capital sectors' problematic, which is compounded 
in the Paraguayan case by the intermingling of such groups. 
Also, the suggestion that there is a serious conflict between 
the various factions of the bourgeoisie is weakened by the non-zero-
sum conflict involved: 
'The point is that both positions offer complementary 
and non-antagonistic proposals for deepening the inter-
nationalisation of the economy and achieving the same 
objective ... while both groups essentially support 
the strategy of 'desarrollo hacia afuera', what is at 
stake is competing views over how to use the energy to 
realise the goals that both groups hold in common; the 
difference between them is means, not ends.'81 
This view is corroborated by the possibility of both sectors 
benefitting from a compromise model of development: 
' ... the promotion of agribusiness and electro-
intensive industries will benefit directly manu-
facturing capital through the formation of joint 
ventures with regional and international capital; 
it will also benefit Paraguay's finance and commercial 
capital, as it will increase trade and foreign 
exchange flows. It is certainly not a zero-sum game 
where one group's benefit is another group's loss. 
It is probably more correct to see the discussion of these 
strategies as reflecting the increasing political power of certain 
pressure groups, rather than the exact representations of class 
positions antipathetic to Stroessner. To this extent, the contra-
dictions within the dominant class and between them and Stroessner 
are only secondary, and do not represent the heralding of a new form 
of political system, although at the very least it does represent an 
increasing complexity of the balancing of interest groups. It is 
possible to see how Stroessner has made slow but important 
concessions to the 'nationalist lobby' over (i) the non-change of the 
grid and (ii) the promotion of some industrialisation projects. The 
key issue now becomes the renegotiation of the price in terms of 
a) the amount of revenue, b) the manner in which it is used and 
c) the groups who will benefit. The amount of political leverage 
accruing from a) to c) will clearly be a central pointer to future 
political development, not least because excluded sectors may not be 
so patient in accepting the enormous amount of private appropriation 
of state funds and personal benefit to be gained from the Itaipu 
project, as many of the companies involved in the contract work have 
been set up and maintained by high government officials. 
The demise of a personalist system? 
While it is easier to examine more 'empirical' events like the 
political impact of Itaipu, the contradiction between a 'new dynamic 
phase of capitalist expansion' and an immobile political system, 
dependent on corruption and clientelism for its survival, remains 
much 
more on a theoretical level. It has been argued or assumed by 
some commentators that the system has become too complex to be 
controlled by one man, or that there is an increasing need for a more 
impartial, bureaucratic and efficient system to engineer the growing 
capitalist expansion. 
On the one hand, certain sectors of the dominant class have 
emerged who are in favour of a modification of the state apparatus 
for greater efficiency and growth and in favour of freer competition, 
especially in the awarding of contracts, and against the repression 
and corruption of the Stronista state. There is increasing debate 
as to the extent to which it is possible to identify separate sectors 
of 'renovadores1 and 1conservadores1 both within the Colorado party 
and the army, and the extent to which these are linked to parties 
outside the Colorado party. It is not within the scope of this 
paper to explore the nature of the various splits, except to state 
that (i) it is clear that certain sectors are both distancing them-
selves from Stroessner and are engaged in a certain amount of 
political bargaining in anticipation of a possible post-Stroessner 
era; and (ii) these sectors are split along a kaleidoscope of 
strategies towards Itaipu, long-term development, economic interests 
and, of course, personal ties.85 
On the other hand, it is not clear to what extent the estimated 
50% participation of contraband in the Paraguayan economy will have 
to be reduced to allow for more efficient capital accumulation. 
Given that the boom in the economy in the 1970s was partly based on 
favourable international factors, the prospects for maintained growth 
are not good. A drop in world prices for certain crops, a run-down 
in the construction work around Itaipu and delays in the commencement 
of work on Yacyreta has already had a serious effect on the perform-
ance of the economy. 1982 witnessed a 2.5% drop in GNP after years 
of impressive economic growth that was obviously a central factor in 
the 'legitimacy' of the regime. 
There are suggestions that the government's capacity to pay off 
an increasing foreign debt (an estimated 1.2 billion dollars by 1982) 
will be seriously hampered by the political obstacles put in the way 
of improving its ability to increase state revenue, either by 
restricting contraband or by taxing high-income groups. The political 
significance of such economic necessities lies of course in the fact 
that any move to restrict contraband or to tighten up legal controls 
for a more regulated economy will come up against powerful vested 
interests in the status quo. At least on a theoretical level, 
there is no reason a priori why a personalist system cannot co-exist 
with a higher stage of capitalist growth. Although there may be 
demands for some decentralisation of decision-making, Stroessner has 
been very 'efficient' in overseeing high economic growth in the 
1970s, largely through the introduction of a significant degree of 
capital penetration into the agrarian sector. 87 
It is this modernisation of the agrarian sector that is one of 
the most striking features of the 1970s, and the development most 
likely to introduce profound changes in the social structure. It 
is impossible to assess accurately the degree to which the arrival 
of commercial agriculture has already broken down the old 
latifundista-minifundista structure and has replaced it with 
capitalist forms of production. It is clear that large sections of 
traditional peasant economies are now more orientated towards the 
market and the cultivation of cash crops. The posited evolution of 
the Paraguayan minifundista into an agrarian proletariat is the 
subject of much debate. Historically, two factors have especially 
delayed proletarianisation in Paraguay. The first has been the 
general availability of land, and the second has been the state-
administered colonisation programme of 'campesinacion', which sought 
to involve more small producers in the market economy, but to keep 
them as minifundistas. While small-holders still make up an 
estimated 60% of cotton production, the state policy is increasingly 
under threat from the increasing demand for wage labour by agro-
industrial companies operating in the Central and Eastern Regions. 
But, at the same time, the capacity for such agro-industries to 
incorporate large numbers of workers is known to be limited. The 
only assertion that can be made with any certainty is that the 
potential for conflict, especially in the EBR, between Paraguayan 
minifundistas, Brazilian colonists and agribusiness interests is 
high, although at present that conflict has not made a large 
political impact. 89 
In conclusion, the situation in the EBR is one of five pointers 
to the long-term evolution of Paraguayan politics. The other four 
are: 1) Paraguay's closer identification with Brazilian interests 
and the possibility of unleashing a nationalist backlash; 2) the 
problem of the price and use of Itaipu's electricity and the delay 
in the construction of Yacyreta; 3) the increasing complexity of 
resolving the conflicts associated with the emergence of new social 
pressure groups from within the dominant classes; k) the task of 
maintaining economic growth within the present context of an 
inefficient capitalist system and powerful contraband operations. 
If Stroessner shows the same political skill in adapting to these 
new internal and international conditions, the most significant 
determinant of his continuismo may yet prove to be his reported ill 
health. 
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